Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)

In one of the most foolish and surprising foreign policy speeches ever heard on the Senate floor, Richard Lugar has effectively advocated surrender in Iraq.

“Our continuing absorption with military activities in Iraq is limiting our diplomatic assertiveness there and elsewhere in the world,” Lugar said.

“Our political timeline will not support a rational course adjustment in Iraq, unless such an adjustment is initiated very soon.”

Lugar declared there’s not enough time for the surge–the counterinsurgency strategy devised by General David Petraeus to secure and pacify Baghdad and Anbar province–to work. 

“A diplomatic offensive is likely to be easier in the context of a tactical drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq,” Lugar said.

“A drawdown would increase the chances of stimulating greater economic and diplomatic assistance for Iraq from multilateral organizations and European allies, who have sought to limit their association with an unpopular war.”

Does Lugar really believe eliminating al-Qaeda in Iraq isn’t necessary and they would allow humanitarian aid and diplomacy to thrive? Does Lugar believe diplomacy with Iran is successfully stopping them from developing a nuclear weapon and would stop them from meddling in Iraqi affairs?

While Lugar acknowledges that the security strategy is working and probably could achieve its goals he accepts as a given “the short period framed by our own domestic political debate.” Can’t Lugar alter the domestic debate by demonstrating that the new security strategy has a chance and must be given time to work?

David Kilcullen writes at Small Wars Journal:

On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual “surge of operations.” I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.

These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we’re doing in Baghdad and what’s happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don’t plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have “gone quiet” as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

When we speak of “clearing” an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don’t get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that’s OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain–as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.

The “terrain” we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. . . . [B]ecause [the enemy] needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. And he can’t just “go quiet” to avoid that threat. He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma (which warms my heart, quite frankly, after the cynical obscenities these gang members have inflicted on the innocent Iraqi non-combatant population). That’s the intent here. . . . Of course, we still go after all the terrorist and extremist leaders we can target and find, and life has become increasingly “nasty, brutish, and short” for this crowd. But we realize that this is just a shaping activity in support of the main effort, which is securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists, extremist militias, and insurgents who need them to survive.

Is there a strategic risk involved in this series of operations?

Absolutely. Nothing in war is risk-free. We have chosen to accept and manage this risk, primarily because a low-risk option simply will not get us the operational effects that the strategic situation demands. We have to play the hand we have been dealt as intelligently as possible, so we’re doing what has to be done. . . .

Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the “defensive crouch” with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.

It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing. The politics of the matter then can be decisive, provided the Iraqis use the time we have bought for them to reach the essential accommodation.

All this may change. These are long-term operations: the enemy will adapt and we’ll have to adjust what we’re doing over time. Baq’ubah, Arab Jabour and the western operations are progressing well, and additional security measures in place in Baghdad have successfully tamped down some of the spill-over of violence from other places. The relatively muted response (so far) to the second Samarra bombing is evidence of this. Time will tell, though.

Serious people seriously explain what’s happening on the ground in Iraq and explain the surge specifically as it plays out. If you wait for news from the mainstream media or listen to the bloviating politicians it will be impossible to learn the facts of progress in Iraq. You will only here of massive bombings but nothing of U.S. Military and coalition forces results.

An honorable mention for Moonbat goes to George Voinovich (R-OH) who echoed Lugar’s call for withdrawal.

“If everyone knows we’re leaving, it will put the fear of God in them.”

Clearly Senator Voinovich is not dealing with reality when Jihadists kill so they can meet their God and collect 72 virgins on the way to hell.

Lugars comments set off cheers amongst Democrats who want to surrender immediately. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) hailed:

“When we finally end this war — and the history books are written — I believe that Sen. Lugar’s words . . . could be remembered as a turning point.”

Turning point to what, defeat?

Retired General Jack Keane told the New York Sun last week,

“The tragedy of these efforts is we are on the cusp of potentially being successful in the next year in a way that we have failed in the three-plus preceding years, but because of this political pressure, it looks like we intend to pull out the rug from underneath that potential success.” 

Moonbat is a special feature of Liberally Conservative and posted each Saturday. For previous awards visit Moonbat Awards.